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Abstract: Ranking theory is one of the salient formal representations 
of doxastic states. It differs from others in being able to represent 
belief in a proposition (= taking it to be true), to also represent degrees 
of belief (i.e. beliefs as more or less firm), and thus to generally 
account for the dynamics of these beliefs. It does so on the basis of 
fundamental and compelling rationality postulates and is hence one 
way of explicating the rational structure of doxastic states. Thereby it 
provides foundations for accounts of defeasible or nonmonotonic 
reasoning. It has widespread applications in philosophy, it proves to 
be most useful in Artificial Intelligence, and it has started to find 
applications as a model of reasoning in psychology. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Epistemic or doxastic attitudes1 representing how the world is like come in 
degrees, whether you call them degrees of belief, uncertainty, plausibility, etc. 
There are various accounts of those degrees, amply presented in this handbook.2 
The interests in those accounts are manifold. Philosophers are concerned with the 
rational nature of those degrees, AI researchers are interested in their 
computational feasibility, psychologists deal with their actual manifestations, and 
all sides argue about how well they are suited to model human reasoning. 
However, we also have the notion of belief simpliciter. Related notions are 
those of acceptance or judgment. These are indeed the more basic notions when it 
comes to truth, to truly representing the world. Beliefs can be true, but degrees of 
belief cannot. The latter rather relate to action (see chapter 8.2 by Peterson in this 
volume). Accounts of degrees of belief invariably have great difficulties in doing 
																																																								
1  Strictly speaking, “epistemic” only refers to knowledge, although it is often 
used more widely. Because we will talk only about belief, we prefer to use 
“doxastic” throughout. See also chapter 5.1 by van Ditmarsch (in this volume). 
2  See chapters 4.1 by Hájek & Staffel, 4.5 by Chater & Oaksford, 4.7 by 
Dubois & Prade, 8.3 by Glöckner, and 8.4 by Hill (in this volume). 
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justice to this fundamental point. There is a questionable tendency to take degrees 
of belief as basic and to belittle those difficulties. 
So we need to theoretically account for belief simpliciter. The first attempt was 
doxastic logic (see chapter 5.1 by van Ditmarsch in this volume). However, it is 
static and misses a dynamic perspective. This has been unfolded in belief revision 
theory (see chapter 5.2 by Rott in this volume). However, it has problems with 
iterated belief revision required for a complete dynamic account. 
Ranking theory promises both to represent belief and degrees of belief and to 
provide a complete dynamics for both. These features give it a prominent place in 
the spectrum of possible theories. It was first presented in English in Spohn 
(1988) and fully developed in Spohn (2012). Easy access is provided in Spohn 
(2009). Its far-reaching applications in philosophy of science, epistemology, and 
even to normative reasoning may be found, e.g., in Spohn (2012, 2015, 2019). 
There is no place here to go into any of them. 
Below we present the basics of the theory in Section 2 and its dynamic aspects 
in Section 3. Section 4 is comparative. Section 5 gives a short introduction to its 
relevance for Artificial Intelligence, and Section 6 explains how it can be put to 
use in psychology. 
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2. The Basics of Ranking Theory 
 
Grammatically, “believe” is a transitive verb. In the phrase “a believes that p”, “a” 
refers to a (human) subject and “that p” seems to be the object. What does “that p” 
stand for, what are the objects of belief? This is a difficult and most confusing 
issue extensively discussed in philosophy (under the rubric “propositions”; see, 
e.g., McGrath 2012). Here, we cut short the issue, as usual in formal epistemology, 
by saying in a non-committal way that “that p” stands for the proposition 
expressed by “p”, where that proposition is its truth condition, the set of 
possibilities or possible worlds in which p obtains or “p” is true. 
Hence, we simply assume a set W of (mutually exclusive and jointly 
exhaustive) possibilities. These may be coarse-grained and refer only to a few 
things of interest; they need not consist of entire possible worlds. Each subset of 
W, i.e. each element of the power set P(W) of W, is a proposition. 
Now, the basic representation of a belief state is simply as the set of 
propositions believed or taken to be true in that state, its belief set. Traditionally, a 
belief set B Í P(W) has to satisfy two rationality requirements: B must be 
consistent, i.e., ⋂B ≠ Æ, and B must be deductively closed, i.e., if ⋂B Í A, then A 
Î B. 
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These two rationality requirements may seem entirely obvious. The rationale 
of deductive logic is to check what we must not believe and what we are 
committed to believe. Note, however, that deductive closure is lost when we 
identify belief with probability above a certain threshold; it easily happens that the 
probabilities of two propositions is above the threshold, while that of their 
conjunction is below. Thus, the lottery and the preface paradox and the general 
desire to stick to a probabilistic representation of belief have led to a contestation 
of these requirements (see, e.g., Christensen 2005). Here we stick to them as 
absolutely basic (see chapter 3.1 by Steinberger in this volume). Of course, these 
requirements can be maintained only under a dispositional understanding of 
belief; occurrent thought cannot be deductively closed. 
The notion of a belief set is static. However, belief sets continuously change, 
and we must account for how they change (or should rationally change). We 
cannot do so on a qualitative level. In those changes we often give up old beliefs 
and replace them by new ones, and then we give up less well entrenched beliefs 
and keep better entrenched ones (see chapter 5.2 by Rott in this volume). Roughly, 
this calls for some entrenchment order or, indeed, for some kind of degrees of 
belief measuring the strength of entrenchment. Here, ranking theory commences. 
Let us start with some brief formal explanations.	
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Definition 1: k is a negative ranking function for W iff k is a function from P(W) 
into the set of natural numbers plus infinity ¥ such that for all A, B Í W: 
(1) k(W) = 0 and k(Æ) = ¥, 
(2) k(A È B) = min {k(A), k(B)} (the law of disjunction). 
 
The basic interpretation is that k expresses degrees of disbelief (whence the 
qualification ‘negative’). If k(A) = 0, A is not disbelieved at all. This allows that 
k(~A) = 0 as well (where ~A is the negation of A); then we have indifference or 
suspension of judgment regarding A. If k(A) > 0, A is disbelieved or taken to be 
false, and the more so, the larger k(A). So, positive belief in A is expressed by 
disbelief in ~A, i.e., by k(~A) > 0 (which implies that k(A) = 0). 
This interpretation explains axioms (1) and (2). (1) says that the tautology W is 
not disbelieved, and hence the contradiction Æ is not believed. This entails that 
beliefs are consistent according to k. (1) moreover says that the contradiction is 
indeed maximally disbelieved. And (2) states that you cannot disbelieve a 
disjunction less strongly than its disjuncts. This entails in particular that if you 
believe two conjuncts, you also believe their conjunction. Hence, beliefs are 
deductively closed according to k. In other words, the belief set B = {A | k(~A) > 
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0} associated with k satisfies the two basic rationality requirements. Note, 
moreover, that (1) and (2) entail: 
 
(3) either k(A) = 0 or k(~A) = 0 (or both) (the law of negation), 
 
i.e., you cannot (dis)believe A and ~A at once. 
For an illustration, consider Tweetie. Tweetie has, or fails to have, each of 
three properties: being a bird (B), being a penguin (P), and being able to fly (F). 
This opens eight possibilities. Suppose you have no idea who or what Tweetie is, 
but somehow you do not think that it might be a penguin. Then your negative 
ranks for the eight possibilities (which determine the ranks for all other 
propositions) may be the following (chosen in some plausible way—but see 
below how the numbers may be justified): 
 
k B Ç ~P B Ç P ~B Ç ~P ~B Ç P 
F 0 4 0 11 
~F 2 1 0 8 
 
(Table 1) 
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In this case, the strongest proposition you believe is that Tweetie is either no 
penguin and no bird (~B Ç ~P) or a flying bird and no penguin (F Ç B Ç ~P); all 
other possibilities are disbelieved. Hence, you neither believe that Tweetie is a 
bird nor that it is not a bird. You are also indifferent concerning its ability to fly. 
But you believe, e.g.: if Tweetie is a bird, it is not a penguin and can fly (~B È 
(~P Ç F)); and if Tweetie is a penguin, it can fly (~P È F)—each if-then taken as 
material implication. Surely, you believe the latter only because you believe that 
Tweety is not a penguin in the first place. The large ranks in the last column 
indicate your strong disbelief in penguins not being birds. This may suffice as a 
first illustration. 
We will see the reasons for starting with negative ranks. But, of course, we can 
also introduce the positive counterpart by defining b to be a positive ranking 
function iff there is a negative ranking function k such that b(A) = k(~A) for all 
propositions A. b represents degrees of belief. Of course, (1) and (2) translate 
directly into axioms for b. 
We may as well represent degrees of belief and degrees of disbelief in a single 
function by defining t to be a two-sided ranking function iff there is a negative 
ranking function k and the corresponding positive ranking function b such that 
t(A) = b(A) – k(A) = k(~A) – k(A) for all propositions A. Thus we have t(A) > 0, 
< 0, or = 0 according to whether A is believed, disbelieved, or neither in t. 
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Therefore this is perhaps the most intuitive notion. However, the mathematics is 
best done in terms of negative ranking functions. It is clear, though, that the three 
functions are interdefinable. 
There is an important interpretational degree of freedom that we have not yet 
noticed. So far, we said that belief in A is represented by k(~A) = b(A) = t(A) > 0. 
However, we may often find it useful to raise the threshold for belief, as we do 
informally in asking: “Do you really believe A?” That is, we may as well say that 
belief in A is only represented by k(~A) = b(A) = t(A) > z for some z ≥ 0. This 
seems to be a natural move. Belief is vague. Where does it commence, when does 
it cease? And this vagueness seems well represented by that parameter z. This 
move at the same time enlarges the range of suspension of judgment to the 
interval from –z to z. The remarkable point about axioms (1) and (2) is that they 
guarantee belief sets to be consistent and deductively closed, however we choose 
the threshold z. They are indeed equivalent to this general guarantee. 
 
3. Conditional Ranks, Reasons, and the Dynamics of Ranks 
 
So far, we have sketched only the static part of ranking theory. However, we 
mentioned that the numeric ranks are essentially used to account for the dynamics 
of belief; they are not just to represent greater and lesser firmness of (dis)belief. 
To achieve this, the crucial notion is that of conditional ranks. 
10		
 
Definition 2: Let k be a negative ranking function for W and k(A) < ¥. Then the 
conditional rank of B given A is defined as k(B | A) = k(A Ç B) – k(A). 
 
We might rewrite this definition as: 
 
(4) k(A Ç B) = k(A) + k(B | A) (the law of conjunction). 
 
This is highly intuitive. For, what is your degree of disbelief in A Ç B? One way 
for A Ç B to be false is that A is false; this contributes k(A) to that degree. 
However, if A is true, B must be false; and this adds k(B | A). 
It immediately follows for all propositions A and B with k(A) < ¥: 
 
(5) k(B | A) = 0 or k(~B | A) = 0 (the conditional law of negation). 
 
This law says that even conditional belief must be consistent. If both, k(B | A) and 
k(~B | A), were > 0, both, B and ~B, would be (dis-)believed given A, and this 
must be excluded, as long as the condition A itself is considered possible. Indeed, 
given definition 2 and axiom (1), we could axiomatize ranking theory also by (5) 
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instead of (2). Hence, the only substantial assumption written into ranking 
functions is conditional consistency. 
Axioms (1) and (2) did not refer to any cardinal properties of ranking functions. 
However, the definition of conditional ranks involves arithmetical operations and 
thus presupposes a cardinal understanding of ranks. We will see below how this 
may be justified. We hasten to add that one could as well define positive 
conditional ranks by b(B | A) = k(~B | A) and two-sided conditional ranks by t(B | 
A) = k(~B | A) – k(B | A). 
As an illustration, consider again Table 1 and the conditional beliefs contained 
therein. We can see that precisely the (material) if-then propositions non-
vacuously held true correspond to conditional beliefs. According to the k 
specified, you believe, e.g., that Tweetie can fly given it is a bird (since k(~F | B) 
= 1) and also given it is a bird, but not a penguin (since k(~F | B Ç ~P) = 2), and 
that Tweetie cannot fly given it is a penguin (since k(F | P) = 3). Hence, your 
vacuous belief in the material implication “if Tweety is a penguin, it can fly” does 
not amount to a corresponding conditional belief. In other words: “if, then” 
expresses conditional belief rather than material implication (see also chapter 6.1 
by Starr in this volume). 
A first fundamental application of conditional ranks lies in the notion of an 
epistemic reason, which is at the center of the entire handbook. It is very natural 
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to say that A is a reason for B iff A speaks in favor of B or confirms B, if A makes 
B more plausible or less implausible, or if B is more credible or less incredible 
given A than given ~A. This explanation works for any conception of conditional 
degrees of belief. In a probabilistic interpretation it amounts to Carnap’s notion of 
incremental confirmation or positive relevance (Carnap 1950/62), which is basic 
for confirmation theory (see chapter 4.3 by Merin in this volume). Ranking-
theoretically, it leads to 
 
Definition 3: A is a reason for B relative to the negative ranking function k or the 
associated two-sided ranking function t iff t(B | A) > t(B |~A). 
 
We may show that if A is a deductive reason for B, i.e., if A Í B, then A is also 
a reason for B according to definition 3 (given k(A), k(~B) < ¥). Clearly, this 
definition provides only a subjectively relativized notion of a reason entirely 
depending on the subject’s doxastic state. Philosophers strive for a more objective 
notion of a reason3, perhaps because they take objective deductive reasons as a 
paradigm. In our view, the extent to which a more objective notion may be 
reached is a philosophically fundamental, alas very open issue (see Spohn, 2018). 																																																								
3 See also chapters 2.1 by Broome, 2.2 by Wedgwood, and 12.2 by Smith (in 
this volume). 
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On this account, reasons can take four significant forms, depending on whether 
t(B | A) and t(B |~A) are positive or negative. E.g., A is a sufficient reason for B iff 
B is believed given A and not believed given ~A. We suggest that this is indeed 
the core meaning of the term “sufficient reason”, although it is often used 
differently. 
Moreover, we may define that B is (doxastically) irrelevant to or independent 
of A if neither A nor ~A is a reason for B. On this basis, a theory of (conditional) 
independence can be developed in ranking terms in far-reaching analogy to the 
probabilistic theory. For instance, the theory of Bayes nets (see chapter 4.2 by 
Hartmann in this volume) works equally well in ranking theory (see Goldszmidt 
& Pearl, 1996). 
A second fundamental application of conditional ranks lies in the dynamics of 
beliefs and ranks. As in probability theory, we may say that we should simply 
move to the degrees of belief conditional on the evidence E learned. Thereby, 
though, the evidence E acquires maximal certainty, either probability 1 or positive 
rank ¥. This seems too restrictive. In general, evidence may be (slightly) 
uncertain, and our rules for doxastic change through evidence or learning—we do 
not attend to changes caused in other ways like forgetting—should take account 
of this. In ranking theory, it is achieved by two principles: first, conditional ranks 
given the evidence E and given its negation ~E are not changed by the evidence 
itself—how could it change them?—and second, the evidence E does not become 
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maximally certain, but improves its position by n ranks, where n is a free 
parameter characterizing the specific information process.4 These two 
assumptions suffice to uniquely determine the kinematics of ranking functions, 
i.e., ranking-theoretic conditionalization. 
In order to see how this works look again at our Tweety example. Suppose you 
learn in some way and accept with firmness 2 that Tweetie is a bird. Thus you 
shift up ~B-possibilities by 2 and keep constant the rank differences within B and 
within ~B. This results in the posterior ranking function k': 	
k' B Ç ~P B Ç P ~B Ç ~P ~B Ç P 
F 0 4 2 13 
~F 2 1 2 10 
 
(Table 2) 	
In k' you believe that Tweetie is a bird able to fly, but not a penguin; you still 
neglect this possiblity. So, in k' you believe more than in k; in belief revision 																																																								
4  This is completely analogous to Jeffrey conditionalization in probability 
theory (see Jeffrey 1983, ch. 11, and chapter 4.1 by Hájek & Staffel in this 
volume). 
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theory (cf. Chapter 5.2 of Rott in this volume) this would be called a belief 
expansion. 
Next, to your surprise, you tentatively learn and accept, say with firmness 1, 
that Tweetie is indeed a penguin. This results in another ranking function k'', 
which shifts all P-possibilities down by 1 and all ~P-possibilities up by 1, so that 
P is indeed believed with firmness 1 (i.e., k''(~P) = 1): 
 
k'' B Ç ~P B Ç P ~B Ç ~P ~B Ç P 
F 1 3 3 12 
~F 3 0 3 9 
 
(Table 3) 
 
So, you have changed your mind and believe in k'' that Tweetie is a penguin bird 
that cannot fly. In belief revision theory this would be called a belief revision. 
Obviously, belief contraction (cf. Chapter 5.2 of Rott in this volume), where you 
simply give up a belief previously held without replacing it by a new one, can also 
be modeled by ranking-theoretic conditionalization. The example already 
demonstrates that this rule of belief change can be iteratively applied ad libitum. 
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An important application of ranking-theoretic conditionalization is that it 
delivers a measurement procedure for ranks that justifies the cardinality of ranks. 
This procedure refers to iterated belief contraction. Its point is this: if your iterated 
contractions behave as prescribed by ranking theory5, then that behavior uniquely 
determines your ranking function up to a multiplicative constant. That is, your 
ranks can thereby be measured on a ratio scale (see Hild & Spohn 2008). The 
consequences of the fact that ranks are measured only on a ratio scale await 
investigation. They imply, e.g., a problem analogous to the problem of the 
interpersonal comparison of utilities. 
 
4. Comparisons 
 
The formal structure defined by axioms (1) and (2) has been called Baconian 
probability by Cohen (1980). Its first clear appearance is in the functions of 
potential surprise developed by Shackle (1949). The structure is also hidden in 
Rescher (1964) and is clearly found in Cohen’s own work in Cohen (1970, 1977). 
The crucial formal advance of ranking theory lies in the definition of conditional 
ranks, which is nowhere found in these works and which makes the theory a 
properly cardinal one. 
																																																								
5  In fact, we need no more than twofold non-vacuous contractions. 
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Belief revision theory was precisely about the dynamics of belief. However, 
they only conceived of entrenchment orders. And within their ordinal framework, 
there was no clear solution of the problem of iterated belief revision (see chapter 
5.2 of Rott in this volume). 
Possibility theory, building on early work of Zadeh (1978) and developed by 
Dubois and Prade (see chapter 4.7 by Dubois & Prade in this volume), is in fact 
equivalent to ranking theory; (2) is the characteristic property of possibility 
measures. However, the interpretation of those measures was intentionally left 
open, leaving considerable formal uncertainty as to how conceive of conditional 
degrees of possibility. 
The theory of Dempster-Shafer belief functions, as developed in Shafer (1976), 
seems to be a far more general theory (see again chapter 4.7 of Dubois & Prade in 
this volume), which comprises probability theory and also ranking theory as a 
special case. Shafer (1976, ch. 10) defines so-called consonant belief functions 
which appear to be equivalent to negative ranking functions. However, their 
respective dynamic behavior diverges, a fact that prevents reduction of ranking 
theory to the DS theory (see Spohn 2012, sect. 11.9). 
Of course, the largest comparative issue is how ranking theory relates to 
probability theory. A comparison of their axioms and their form of 
conditionalization suggests translating the sum of probabilities into the minimum 
of ranks and the product and the quotient of probabilities into the addition and the 
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subtraction of ranks. This translation works only for negative ranks; that’s why 
the latter provide the formally preferred version of ranking theory. And it explains 
why very many things that can be done with probability theory also work for 
ranking theory in a meaningful way. 
However, the translation does not justify conceiving ranks in probabilistic 
terms. As mentioned in section 2, belief in A cannot be probabilistically 
represented by P(A) = 1 – e, if one sticks to the consistency and deductive closure 
of belief sets. The relation of probability and belief is hotly debated in philosophy 
without a clear solution emerging (see, e.g., the proposals of Leitgeb 2017 and 
Raidl & Skovgaard-Olsen 2016). Therefore, our attitude has always been to 
independently develop ranking theory as a theory of belief. 
 
5. Ranking Functions in Artificial Intelligence 
 
Besides probability theory and logic, ranking functions are among the most 
popular formalisms used for knowledge representation6 and reasoning (KRR), and 
their popularity is still increasing because they provide a very versatile framework 
for many central operations in KRR, as already sections 2-4 pointed out. Most 
importantly, ranking functions are a convenient common basic tool for 
																																																								
6  In AI, the distinction between knowledge and belief is usually quite vague. 
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nonmonotonic reasoning and belief revision. Belief revision has been already 
explained in more detail in section 3, and nonmonotonic reasoning also deals with 
belief dynamics in that conclusions may be given up when new information 
arrives (so, the consequence relation is not monotonic, as in classical logic). Both 
fields emerged in the 1980’s (partly) as a reaction to the incapability of classical 
logic to handle problems in everyday life that intelligent systems like robots were 
expected to tackle. Knowledge, or belief about the world is usually uncertain, and 
the world is always changing. Therefore, AI systems built upon classical logics 
failed. So-called preferential models (see Makinson 1989) provide an important 
semantics for nonmonotonic logics, their basic idea is to order worlds according 
to normality and focus on the minimal, i.e., the most plausible ones for reasoning. 
Likewise, AGM belief revision theory (see chapter 5.2 by Rott in this volume) 
needs orderings of worlds to become effective. For both fields, ranking functions 
offer quite a perfect technical tool that also complies nicely with the intuitions 
behind the techniques. Moreover, they can also evaluate conditionals and are an 
attractive qualitative counterpart to probabilities (see section 3).	
Judea Pearl was probably the first renowned AI scientist to make use of 
ranking functions; his famous system Z (Pearl 1990) is based on them. He has 
continuously emphasized the structural commonsense qualities of probabilities 
and developed ranking functions as an interesting qualitative counterpart to 
probabilities. He set up his system Z as an “ultimate system of nonmonotonic 
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reasoning” in terms of ranking functions. To date, it is one of the best and most 
convenient approaches to implement high-quality nonmonotonic reasoning.	
Consequently, ranking functions are deeply connected with nonmonotonic and 
uncertain reasoning and with belief change, which are core topics in KRR. Many 
researchers make use of them in one way or another even if they rely on more 
general frameworks. Darwiche & Pearl (1997) presented general postulates for 
the iterated revision of general epistemic states, but illustrated their account with 
ranking functions. So did Jin & Thielscher (2007) and Delgrande & Jin (2012) 
when they devised novel postulates for iterated and multiple revision. 
Interestingly, the independence properties for advanced belief revision which 
were proposed in those papers can be related to independence with respect to 
ranking functions (see Spohn 2012, ch. 7) in analogy with probabilistic 
independence (see Kern-Isberner & Huvermann, 2017).	
Indeed, as suggested in section 3, ranking functions are particularly well suited 
for iterated belief change because they can easily be changed in accordance with 
AGM theory, returning new ranking functions which are readily available for a 
successive change operation. The main AGM operations are revision (adopting a 
belief) and contraction (giving up a belief), related by Levi and Harper identities 
(see chapter 5.2). In ranking theory, the connections between these operations are 
even deeper, since (iterated) contraction is just a special kind of (iterated) ranking 
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conditionalization. Indeed, the results of (Kern-Isberner et al., 2017) show that 
iterated revision and contractions can be performed by a common methodology.  
Continuing on that, and beyond practicality and diversity of ranking functions, 
it is crucial to understand that they are not just a pragmatically good choice but 
indeed allow for deep theoretical foundations of approaches to reasoning. It is the 
ease and naturalness with which they can handle conditionals—very similar to 
probabilities—that make them an excellent formal tool for modeling reasoning. 
Given that conditionals are, on the one hand, crucial entities for nonmonotonic 
and commonsense reasoning and belief change, and, on the other hand, formal 
entities fully accessible to conditional logics, this capability provides a key feature 
for logic-based approaches connecting nonmonotonic logics and belief change 
theories with commonsense and general human reasoning. More precisely, 
conditional ranks give meaning to differences between degrees in belief when 
observing A vs. A & B (see the law of conjunction in section 3), and the examples 
of belief change given in section 3 illustrate nicely how it is easily possible to 
preserve these differences under change when using ranking functions. This 
property has been elaborated as a principle of conditional preservation in Kern-
Isberner (2004), giving rise to defining c-representations and c-revisions (all 
belief changes shown in section 3 are c-revisions). C-representations are c-
revisions starting from a uniform ranking function and allowing for reasoning 
from conditional belief bases. Ranking theory is one of the few formal 
22		
frameworks that is rich and expressive enough to allow such a precise 
formalization of conditional preservation which supports both belief change and 
inductive reasoning as a common methodology, probability theory is another.	
 
6. Ranking Theory in Psychology 
 
Potentially, ranking theory has applications for many areas of psychology. To 
illustrate, psychological research on belief revision has been carried out under the 
inspiration of AGM theory and probabilistic updating (Baratgin & Politzer 2010; 
Wolf et al. 2012; Oaksford & Chater 2013; see also chapter 5.4 by Gazzo & 
Knauff in this volume). Such work could be extended by ranking theory, given 
that one of its central motivations was to represent a notion of full belief, in 
contrast to probabilistic update mechanisms, while improving upon AGM theory 
to allow for iterative revisions. However, as Colombo et al. (2018) note, 
probabilistic Bayesian approaches are currently enjoying a boom in cognitive 
science to the neglect of alternative formal frameworks, like ranking theory. 
As said, possibility theory is mathematically equivalent to ranking theory, yet 
differs fundamentally in its intended interpretation. In Da Silva Neves et al. 
(2002) and Benferhat et al. (2005), possibility theory was subjected to empirical 
testing. In Da Silva Neves et al. (2002), a direct route was chosen by testing 
whether participants' possibility judgments satisfy the rationality postulates 
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codified in System P augmented by Rational Monotonicity (A |~ C, ¬ (A |~ ¬ B); 
therefore A Ù B |~ C),7 in case their responses violated Monotonicity (A |~ C; 
therefore A Ù B |~ C). Interestingly, no such direct test of ranking theory based on 
the participants' judgments of disbelief, or implausibility, has yet been made. 
What exists is the following. Isberner & Kern-Isberner (2017) investigated 
whether belief revision with ranking functions could retrodict findings of 
temporal delay when processing implausible information in tasks, where 
plausibility judgments would interfere with the task constraints (a finding known 
as "the epistemic Stroop effect"). A guiding assumption underlying this work is 
that ranking theory can be used to represent the situational model that participants 
construct during language comprehension. Moreover, Eichhorn et al. (2018) 
proposed a conditional-logical model based on ranking functions, which allows 
for the elaboration of plausible background knowledge. 
In Ragni et al. (2017), it was investigated whether ranking theory could 
retrodict the suppression effect (Byrne, 1989), where endorsement rates of 
classically valid modus ponens (MP) (A → B, A; therefore B) and modus tollens 
(MT) (A → B, ¬ B; therefore ¬ A) are suppressed when further premises 
indicating possible defeaters are presented. To illustrate, normally inferring “Lisa 
will study late in the library” from the premises “Lisa has an essay to write” and 																																																								
7  Here, |~ represents nonmonotonic or default entailment. 
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“if Lisa has an essay to write, then Lisa will study late in the library” would be 
seen as unproblematic. But if the additional premise “if the library is open, then 
Lisa will study late in the library” becomes available, then participants are much 
more reluctant to draw this inference. However, as Ragni et al. (2017) show, the 
inference mechanism exploiting ranking functions does not in itself retrodict the 
suppression effect. To do so, further assumptions about the underlying knowledge 
base instantiated in long-term memory need to be made. In addition, Ragni et al. 
(2017) present experiments that test ranking theory's ability to predict the 
participants’ reasoning with MP and MT once nonmonotonic keywords such as 
“normally” are inserted. Characteristic of this line of research is that c-
representations are used to inductively infer ranking functions that satisfy the 
constraints set by an assumed knowledge base. 
Moreover, the account of conditionals in Spohn (2013, 2015) has inspired a 
series of experiments. Spohn (2013, 2015) outlines a number of expressive roles 
of conditionals that go beyond the Ramsey test, which merely takes conditionals 
to express conditional beliefs. For instance, conditionals may express reason 
relations as specified in definition 3. In Olsen (2014), a logistic regression model 
was presented to both formulate predictions for the participants' evaluations of the 
conclusions of MP, MT, AC (A → B, B; therefore A), and DA (A → B, ¬ A; 
therefore ¬ B) inferences and to suggest a solution to the problem of updating 
based on conditional information. In Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016a), a reason 
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relation reading of the conditional was contrasted experimentally with the Ramsey 
test in participants' probability and acceptability evaluations of indicative 
conditionals and support was obtained for the reason relation reading. In 
Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2019), it was found that there are patterns of individual 
variation in these results. In Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016b), participants' 
perceived relevance and reason relation evaluations were investigated and some 
first evidence for the explications of reason relations and perceived relevance 
introduced above was obtained. However, characteristic of this latter line of 
research is that it adopts an indirect route to testing ideas from ranking theory by 
exploiting its extension to conditionals in Spohn (2013, 2015) and its parallels to 
probability theory (see also Henrion et al. 1994).  
Presently, paradigms operationalizing degrees of beliefs as probabilities are 
much more well-established than tasks using ranking functions. This is so in spite 
of the fact that the arithmetical operations of ranking theory require much less 
computational effort than those of probability theory. For instance, it is well-
known that participants exhibit difficulties in properly integrating information 
about base rates of the rarity of a given disease in evaluating how likely it is that a 
person has the disease given a positive test result. Yet, interestingly, Juslin et al. 
(2011) find that the notorious base-rate neglect could be reduced when 
participants are given the tasks in a logarithmic format. Juslin et al. (2011) 
therefore conjecture that a linear, additive integration of information is more 
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intuitive in the absence of access to overriding analytic rules that utilize a 
multiplicative format, like probabilities.  
Nevertheless, there is a lack of direct experimental investigations of ranking 
functions. Perhaps due to the following challenges: 
(i) Negative ranking functions are useful for conducting proofs. But it initially 
presents a conceptual challenge to think in terms of disbelief in negations of 
propositions as a way of representing full beliefs. Two-sided ranking functions 
solve this problem. But they come at the cost of having different rules applying to 
the negative and positive range of the scale. 
(ii) An operationalization of ranking functions in terms of iterated contractions 
exists (see above). But it is not one that has received the same kind of 
experimental implementation as the operationalization of probabilities in terms of 
betting quotients. 
(iii) Since negative ranks take natural numbers from 0 to infinity, there is no 
natural way of non-arbitrarily dividing the scale into regions of ascending degrees 
of disbelief other than a region of zero disbelief, a region of above zero disbelief, 
and a region of maximal disbelief. In contrast, the crude division of the 
probability scale of real numbers between 0 and 1 into decimal regions enables 
participants, and experimenters, to make qualitative differentiations between low 
degrees of belief (e.g. [0.0,0.3)), middle degrees of belief (e.g. [0,3-0.7]), and 
strong degrees of belief (e.g.(0.7, 1.0]).  
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If challenges such as these can be overcome in future work, ranking theory 
potentially has a lot to offer to psychology, and cognitive science more generally. 
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